We assess the strength of the different conditions identified in the literature of robust mechanism design. We focus on three conditions: ex post incentive compatibility, robust monotonicity, and robust measurability. Ex post incentive compatibility has been shown to be necessary for any concept of robust implementation, while robust monotonicity and robust measurability have been shown to be necessary for robust (full) exact and virtual implementation, respectively. This paper shows that while violations of ex post incentive compatibility and robust monotonicity do not easily go away, we identify a mild condition on environments in which robust measurability is satisfied by all social choice functions over an open and dense subset of first-order types. We conclude that there is a precise sense in which robust virtual implementation can be significantly more permissive than robust exact implementation. JEL Classification: C72, D78, D82.
Introduction
Our attempt in this paper is to assess the strength of the different conditions identified in the literature of robust mechanism design. These include conditions relevant for partial implementation, as well as full implementation. Such assessment is important in the understanding of the possibilities and limitations in the design of decentralized institutions.
By robustness, what is meant is that the assumption of common knowledge of the entire type space is not made, and hence the goal is that implementation results survive when applied to all type spaces whose higher-order beliefs are compatible with an original simpler common knowledge structure. Consistent with the robustness desideratum, the solution concept in which implementation is sought is the iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
Three conditions are the crucial ones: ex post incentive compatibility, robust monotonicity and robust measurability. Ex post incentive compatibility has been shown to be necessary for robust partial implementation (Bergemann and Morris (2005) ) and also for robust full implementation, both exactly and virtually Morris (2009a,2010) , Artemov, Kunimoto and Serrano (2010) ). 1 When one requires full implementation and this q i (θ −i |θ i ) denote agent i's first-order belief that other agents receive the profile of types θ −i when his payoff type is θ i . Let Q i be the set of such all probabilistic first-order beliefs of agent i. Note that Q i is any subset of Δ(Θ −i ) for each agent i, where Δ(Θ −i ) denotes the set of probability distributions over Θ −i . We call T i ≡ Θ i × Q i the set of first-order types of agent i. Agent i's first-order type t i contains information about his payoff type θ i and the first-order belief over Θ −i conditional on θ i .
Let A denote the set of pure outcomes, which are assumed to be independent of the information state. Suppose A = {a 1 , . . . , a K } is finite. Let Δ(A) denote the set of probability distributions on A.
Agent i's state dependent von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is denoted u i : Δ(A) × Θ → R.
We can now define an environment as E = (A, {u i , Θ i , Q i } i∈N ), which is implicitly understood to be common knowledge among the agents. In particular, if Q i is unrestricted for each i, that is, Q i = Δ(Θ −i ), we call it a payoff environment denoted as E Δ = (A, {u i , Θ i } i∈N ).
We denote a type of agent i by τ i and the agent i's set of types by T i . A type τ i of agent i must include a description of his first-order type, which in turn includes a payoff type. Thus, there is a functiont i : T i → T i , witht i (τ i ) being agent i's first-order type when his type is τ i . We shall writet(τ ) to refer to the profile of first-order types when the type profile is τ . There is also a functionθ i : T i → Θ i , withθ i (τ i ) being agent i's payoff type when his type is τ i . We shall writeθ(τ ) to denote the payoff type profile when the profile of types is τ . With some abuse of notation, letθ i (t i ) be agent i 's payoff type when his first-order type is t i . A type τ i of agent i must also include a description of his beliefs about the types of the other agents; thus, for any τ −i ∈ T −i , π i (τ −i |τ i ) denotes the probability that agent i of type τ i assigns to other agents having types τ −i .
We require that types, first-order types and payoff types are coherent with each other. We express the coherence requirement in the following definition. A type space T is a collection:
if, for every i ∈ N and every type τ i ∈ T i , the following two conditions must hold:
The first part of the definition is just the requirement that first-order type and payoff type be coherent with the agent's type. The second part requires similar coherence between first-order types and payoff types. These two requirements, in turn, imply that, for any
The reader is referred to AKS (2010) for the discussion of our coherence assumption.
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A social choice function (SCF) is a function f : Θ → Δ(A). Note that the domain of the SCFs is not the true type space, but the payoff type space. Fix any coherent type space T throughout. The interim expected utility of agent i of type τ i that pretends to be of type τ i corresponding to an SCF f is defined as:
Define V i (f ; t i |t i ) to be the interim expected utility of agent i of first-order type t i that pretends to be of first-order type t i corresponding to an SCF f as follows:
where
We often use the following relationship between interim utility and first-order interim utility of agent i:
for any coherent type space T .
denote a (pure) strategy for agent i and Σ i his set of pure strategies. 5 Let
Let K i (H) denote the set of all undominated strategies for agent i with respect to
5 To be exact, we must use the notation Σi(Ti) to make the underlying type space explicit. We, however, omit this dependence, since it is always clear from the context.
An SCF f is said to be exactly implementable in iteratively undominated strategies for a type space T if there exists a mechanism Γ = (M, g) such that for any σ ∈ K * , g(σ(τ )) = f (θ(τ )) for all τ ∈ T . We add the requirement that this definition should hold for every coherent type space T to obtain the definition of robust implementation:
Definition 3 An SCF f is robustly implementable in iteratively undominated strategies if there exists a mechanism Γ = (M, g) such that for any coherent type space T and any
Consider the following uniform metric on SCFs:
where the notation f (θ|a) refers to the probability with which f implements a ∈ A in the payoff state θ.
An SCF f is said to be ε-implementable in iteratively undominated strategies for a coherent type space T if, there existsε > 0 such that for any ε ∈ (0,ε], there exists an SCF f ε for which d f (f, f ε ) < ε and f ε is exactly implementable in iteratively undominated strategies for the type space T . The definition of robust virtual implementability now follows. 
Definition 4 An SCF

Incentive Compatibility
In a setting that is robust to higher-order beliefs, the standard requirement of Bayesian incentive compatibility is given by the following definition:
The notion of first-order type suggests the following definition, which turns out to be operationally useful:
Definition 6 An SCF f satisfies first-order incentive compatibility if, for any i ∈ N , and any
The next lemma provides a useful link between these concepts and follows directly from Lemma 1: 
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The robust mechanism design literature has often justified the use of ex post incentive compatibility for attaining robust implementation (both for partial and full implementation). We provide this definition next:
Definition 7 An SCF f satisfies ex post incentive compatibility if, for any i ∈ N, θ ∈ Θ, and θ i ∈ Θ i ,
It is easy to see that when Q i = Δ(Θ −i ) for every agent i ∈ N , an SCF f is firstorder incentive compatible if and only if it is ex post incentive compatible. The next result extends this observation slightly but in an important direction. The following result asserts that we cannot relax ex post incentive compatibility by restricting attention to an open dense subset of Δ(
Theorem 1 Suppose that an environment
E = (A, {u i , Θ i , Q i } i∈N ) satisfies the property that Q i ≡ Δ * (Θ −i ) for each i ∈ N and Δ * (Θ −i ) is an open and dense subset of Δ 0 (Θ −i ).
Then, an SCF f satisfies first-order incentive compatibility if and only if it satisfies ex post incentive compatibility.
Proof: It is straightforward to show that if an SCF is ex post incentive compatible, it is also first-order incentive compatible, for any first-order type space.
Hence, we focus on the other direction. Let f be a first-order incentive compatible SCF over an open and dense set Δ * (Θ −i ). Suppose, by way of contradiction, that f is not ex post incentive compatible. This implies that there exist i ∈ N, θ ∈ Θ, and θ i = θ i such that
By the continuity of expected utility, we can construct q i ∈ Δ 0 (Θ −i ) such that q i (θ −i |θ i ) = 1 − ε for ε > 0 small enough and
Once again, by the continuity of expected utility, there exist an open neighborhood O δ (q i ) ⊂ Δ 0 (Θ −i ), i.e., a δ > 0 small enough such that for any dq i ∈ R H with the property that dq i < δ,
Thus, we have shown that any nearby first-order belief q i +dq i ∈ O δ (q i ) satisfies the above inequality, and
Jehiel et al (2006) and Hashimoto (2008) show that ex post incentive compatible SCFs are generically constant. 6 Therefore, ex post incentive compatibility is quite demanding if one allows an unrestricted domain of environments. While these results provide a limit for the success of robust implementation, there are some interesting subdomains of environments in which ex post incentive compatibility is still permissive. The reader is referred to BM (2009b) for such a class of environments where some positive results are obtained. Moreover, in auction environments, Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) and Bikhchandani (2006) also propose some subdomains of environments where ex post incentive compatibility is not restrictive.
Monotonicity
A number of monotonicity conditions have been suggested in order to answer the question of (full) exact implementation. We begin this section with several standard definitions in the Bayesian implementation literature, suitably adapted to the robust setting.
For agent i, consider a mapping
i∈N is a collection of such mappings where at least one differs from the identity mapping.
Given an SCF f and a deception α,
is the SCF that would be implemented if the planner wanted to implement f but the agents were to use the deception α : then, in each payoff state θ, instead of realizing f (θ), the outcome f (α(θ)) would result.
For a payoff type θ i ∈ Θ i , an SCF f , and a deception α, let
is what would be implemented if the planner wished to implement f , all agents other than i were to be truthful, and agent i would report that his payoff type is
The following definition is borrowed from BM (2010):
Definition 8 An SCF f satisfies robust monotonicity if for any deception α,
, and an SCF y such that:
Note that the above definition for robust monotonicity, as written, does not exactly coincide with the one presented by BM (2010). Nevertheless, it can be shown that both are equivalent. Assume that Q i = Δ(Θ −i ) for every i ∈ N . Then, robust monotonicity is equivalent to Bayesian monotonicity for every type space. By our Lemma 1, it is easy to see that the above definition is indeed the one for robust monotonicity. mechanisms. For the case of infinite mechanisms, iteratively undominated strategies is more stringent than iterative removal of never best responses. Thus, a fortiori, robust monotonicity is a necessary condition for robust implementation in iteratively undominated strategies.
We shall say that an SCF f satisfies robust monotonicity over Δ 0 if it satisfies robust monotonicity subject to all agents' first-order beliefs used in the condition being restricted to lie in Δ 0 (Θ −i ). We note the following simple observation: Remark: If an SCF f satisfies robust monotonicity, it satisfies robust monotonicity over Δ 0 .
In particular, this implies that robust monotonicity over Δ 0 is also a necessary condition for robust exact implementation in iteratively undominated strategies.
Consider now the following local version of robust monotonicity:
Definition 9 An SCF f satisfies local robust monotonicity if for any deception α,
and an SCF y such that for every open set
, we have that:
Remark: Maintaining the former ("reversal") clause for the definition of local robust monotonicity, we can strengthen the latter ("truth-telling") clause to
. In other words, we replace Q 0 i with Δ 0 (Θ −i ) for the range of possible q i s. In particular, the proof of Theorem 2 below will not be affected by this change. Furthermore, we can also accommodate this change in the discussion of Example 2 in Section 6.
Using this definition, we state and prove our next result:
Theorem 2 An SCF f satisfies robust monotonicity over Δ 0 if and only if it satisfies local robust monotonicity.
Proof: Clearly, if f satisfies robust monotonicity over Δ 0 , it also satisfies local robust monotonicity.
To prove the other implication, assume that f violates robust monotonicity over Δ 0 . This means that there exists an environment with a specific first-order type space (with beliefs for each i in Δ 0 (Θ −i )) over which f violates Bayesian monotonicity. That is, there exists a deception α with f = f • α such that for all i ∈ N and for all θ i ∈ Θ i , there exists q i ∈ Δ 0 (Θ −i ) such that whenever one has that
one also has that
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Since expected utility preferences are continuous and q i is in the interior of the probability simplex, the strictly upper contour sets are open and non-empty, and thus one can rewrite the last two inequalities as follows: whenever one has that
Since these inequalities are strict, one can find an open neighborhood of q i in which the same inequalities obtain. It follows that f violates local robust monotonicity. Remark: The message of the above result is that, whenever one can find a violation of robust monotonicity, i.e., a violation of Bayesian monotonicity in some fixed first-order type space, such a violation can be extended to an open set of priors around the original one. Of course, if one found a violation of robust monotonicity on the boundary of Δ(Θ −i ), it may not be possible to extend it to an open set of priors around the original one; see however Example 2 in Section 6.
Measurability
This section deals with measurability, a condition that is key for virtual implementation in iteratively undominated strateigies. Roughly speaking, it requires that an SCF cannot vary in two payoff states whenever the types compatible with them have identical preferences. It was proposed by Abreu and Matsushima (1992) , and hence, we shall refer to it as A-M measurability. Its robust version has been used in BM (2009a); see also AKS (2010).
Denote by Ψ i a partition of the set of first-order types T i , where ψ i is a generic element of Ψ i and Π i (t i ) is the element of Ψ i that includes first-order type t i . 7 Let Ψ = × i∈N Ψ i and ψ = × i∈N ψ i . An SCF f is measurable with respect to Ψ if, for every i ∈ N and every
Measurability of f with respect to Ψ implies that for any player i, f does not distinguish between any pair of first-order types in the same cell of the partition Ψ i .
For every i ∈ N, t i , t i ∈ T i , and (n − 1) tuple of partitions Ψ −i , we say that t i is equivalent to t i with respect to Ψ −i if, for every f and everyf that are measurable with respect to
Let ρ i (t i , Ψ −i ) be the set of all elements of T i that are equivalent to t i with respect to Ψ −i , and let
7 With respect to Abreu and Matsushima (1992) , recall that Ti is not necessarily finite in our current treatment.
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Note that R i (Ψ −i ) forms an equivalence class on T i , that is, constitutes a partition of T i . We define an infinite sequence of n-tuples of partitions, {Ψ h } ∞ h=0 , where Ψ h = × i∈N Ψ h i in the following way. For every i ∈ N ,
and recursively, for every i ∈ N and every h ≥ 1,
Note that for every h ≥ 0, Ψ h+1 i is the same as, or finer than, Ψ h i . Define Ψ * as follows:
Definition 10 An SCF f satisfies A-M measurability if it is measurable with respect to Ψ * .
Proposition 2 (AKS (2010)) If an SCF f is robustly ε-implementable in iteratively undominated strategies, then it satisfies A-M measurability.
When Q i = Δ(Θ −i ) for each agent i ∈ N , adapting the above algorithm to the separation of types (instead of first-order types), BM (2009a) define the following property.
Definition 11 An SCF f satisfies robust measurability whenever it satisfies A-M measurability for all type spaces coherent with the underlying payoff environment.
Lemma 3 Suppose
Q i = Δ(Θ −i ) for every i ∈ N in an environment E = (A, {u i , Θ i , Q i } i∈N ).
Then, an SCF f satisfies A-M measurability if and only if it satisfies robust measurability.
Proof: Since Q i is unrestricted, robust measurability is equivalent to A-M measurability for all coherent type spaces. (Lemma 1 takes care of the details of the argument.)
We next formalize the idea that robust measurability is almost always satisfied by all SCFs. 8 We consider here unrestricted first-order type spaces.
Recall that the set of alternatives is A = {a 1 , . . . , a K }. Henceforth, we will find it convenient to identify a lottery x ∈ Δ(A) as a point in the (K − 1) dimensional simplex
to be the interim expected utility of agent i of first-order type (θ i , q i ) for the constant SCF that assigns a k in each payoff state Θ, i.e.,
In the rest of the paper, we maintain the following regularity assumption imposed on the environments. An environment E = (A, {u i , Θ i , Q i } i∈N ) is said to satisfy first-order no-total-indifference (first-order NTI) if for 8 For finite environments, the argument can be found in AKS (2010).
10
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each i ∈ N and each first-order type
Hence, in environments satisfying first-order NTI, without loss of generality, for each first-order type (θ i , q i ), normalize expected utility by subtracting the constant min k V k i (θ i , q i ) and dividing by the positive constant max
Consider now the following definition:
Definition 12 A payoff environment E Δ = (A, Θ i , u i ) i∈N is weakly non-separable if, for any i ∈ N , any θ i and θ i ∈ Θ i with θ i = θ i , there exist a ∈ A and θ −i , θ −i ∈ Θ −i with θ −i = θ −i such that:
It is easy to check that weak non-separability excludes private values environments. Outside of private values, when a payoff environment violates it, preferences are strongly separable, in that for at least two payoff types of an agent, the relative impact of interdependence on the change in ex-post utilities is the same and equals 1 for each alternative, and it is independent of -can be separated from-the payoff types of other agents. This justifies the term "weakly non-separable" environments.
The next definition is borrowed from AKS (2010):
Without loss of generality, we focus only on agent i throughout. Since the payoff type space Θ is finite, we can denote
Lemma 4 (The set of first-order beliefs under which FOTD holds is open) Suppose that for any
Then, Δ * is open, i.e., for every q i ∈ Δ * there exists δ > 0 such that for any dq i ∈ R H for which h dq i (θ h −i ) = 0 and dq i < δ, we have that for any θ i , θ i ∈ Θ i with θ i = θ i , and 
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which means that there exist a finite collection of increasing ε i 's with ε 1 < · · · < ε r whose associated open sets also cover Δ(Θ −i ), and a fortiori, also cover Δ * , a subset of Δ 0 (Θ −i ), itself a subset of Δ(Θ −i ).
It follows that Δ * = (
, where
Due to the continuity of expected utility, we can choose δ > 0 sufficiently small so that for any 
Lemma 5 (The set of first-order beliefs under which FOTD holds is dense) Suppose that a payoff environment E
Proof: Since Δ 0 (Θ −i ) is separable, it contains a countable dense subset. Thus, it will suffice to base our arguments on a countable set of pairs q i , q i for which there is a violation of FOTD. That is, consider payoff types θ i , θ i ∈ Θ i with θ i = θ i , such that:
Fix arbitrarily an index set, Λ = {1, 2, . . . }. Assume that each λ ∈ Λ corresponds to a pair of first-order types λ = ((θ i , q i ), (θ m i , q m i )) that exhibits violations of FOTD. Since the payoff environment is weakly non-separable, for each such pair of relevant payoff types
We define θ 
By construction, we note the following three facts:
Fix δ > 0 small enough. Since Θ is finite, we can choose ε > 0 small enough so that dq i < δ. For a sufficiently small δ > 0, we guarantee that q i + dq i ∈ Δ 0 (Θ −i ). By weak non-separability of the payoff environment and by construction of the specific dq i , we get that for every ( , m) ∈ Λ,
So we conclude that for any δ > 0 small enough there exists dq i ∈ R H with dq i < δ such that for any θ i , θ i ∈ Θ i with θ i = θ i , involved in a violation of FOTD, there exists a first-order belief in that δ-neighborhood for which such a violation ceases to exist.
Moreover, by the previous lemma, the set of first-order beliefs for which FOTD holds is open. Thus, for any δ > 0 small enough and for any pair (θ i , q i ), (θ i , q i ), by the continuity of expected utility,
It follows that the set of first-order beliefs for which FOTD holds is dense. The two lemmas together comprise the proof of the following result: Proof: This directly follows from the previous two lemmas, after observing that if an environment satisfies FOTD all first-order types can be separated in the first iteration of the measurability algorithm, implying that the final partition thereof, Ψ * , is the finest partition, consisting of all singletons. 
Define V i to be the set of agent i's normalized first-order expected utility functions. We endow V i with the uniform metric. 9 Let V ≡ V 1 × · · · × V n . Now, we can rephrase the above result in terms of payoffs as follows:
9 In this case, the uniform metric dV is defined by dV (Vi,Ṽi) = max We close this section by extending our logic to higher-order beliefs. We make use of our coherence assumption: 
Proof: Fix an arbitrary coherent type space T . As it will become clear, the argument does not depend on any particular type space coherent with the original environment E.
Having established this, first-order type diversity takes care of the rest of the argument because we define Q i ≡ Δ * (Θ −i ).
Examples
We shall close by revisiting briefly two examples, already contemplated in previous literature. The first one illustrates the assumption of weak non-separability, which we have used in the previous section:
Example 1 (How to generate weak non-separability) Consider the example in BM (2009a, Section 3) , also featured in AKS (2010, Section 8 
where λ i : R → (0, 1) is an increasing function with typical term λ i (h i (θ)) ∈ (0, 1).
This is indeed a class of environments proposed in BM (2009b) The next example shows that in some environments the difference between robust measurability and robust monotonicity is substantial, leading to a significant gap between the success of robust virtual implementation versus robust exact implementation. Serrano (2004) , an elaboration of the original one in Palfrey and Srivastava (1987) , and we proceed to its robust analysis later. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4}. There is a single commodity -money -and all consumers have one unit of the commodity as endowment in each state. The set of payoff types is Θ k = {θ k , θ k , θ k } for k = 1, 2, while Θ j = {θ j , θ j } for j = 3, 4. Let us define a subset of Θ: Θ * = {θ, θ , θ }, where θ = (θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 , θ 4 ), θ = (θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 , θ 4 ), and θ = (θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 , θ 4 ).
Example 2 [Only constant SCFs satisfy local robust monotonicity] We begin by slightly adapting the way the example is presented in
